Due to the substantial time and effort involved in negotiating and confirming a Chapter 11 reorganization plan, and the potential for improperly solicited votes to be disqualified, plan proponents generally are well advised to adhere strictly to the plan voting and disclosure requirements of the Bankruptcy Code. A recent Delaware bankruptcy court decision, In re Indianapolis Downs, LLC,1 indicates that creditors who actively negotiate the terms of a debtor's reorganization can, under certain circumstances, enter into a formal plan support agreement with the debtor
A recent case1 decided by Judge Stuart Bernstein of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York demonstrates that a developer's properly crafted chapter 11 plan of reorganization can effectively "restore" trust funds that it previously had "diverted" under the New York Lien Law.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently affirmed the District Court’s ruling in In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC.1 The Court allowed Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC to require all-cash bids for the asset sale under their proposed plan. This precluded secured creditors from credit bidding, as long as the plan provided those creditors with the “indubitable equivalent” of the value of their claims.
The comprehensive financial reform bill recently passed by the Senate1 creates a new “orderly liquidation authority” (“OLA”) that would allow the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) to seize control of a financial company2 whose imminent collapse is determined to threaten the financial system as a whole.
The United States District Court for the District of Delaware recently affirmed a Bankruptcy Court decision that invalidated the use by creditors of so-called “triangular”, or non-mutual, setoffs in which obligations are offset among not only the parties to a bilateral contract but also their affiliates. In re SemCrude, L.P., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42477 (D. Del.
On May 5, 2009, Judge James Peck, the Bankruptcy Judge in the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy cases, held that the safe harbor provisions of the Bankruptcy Code do not override the mutuality requirements for setoff under section 553(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. As a consequence, the Bankruptcy Court prohibited Swedbank, a non-debtor counter party to a swap agreement, from setting off pre-petition claims against Lehman against funds collected for Lehman’s account postpetition. See In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Bankr. Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
A creditor’s ability to vote on a plan of reorganization is one of its most fundamental rights in a chapter 11 bankruptcy. For strategic investors in distressed debt, the power to vote—and potentially control a voting class (or obtain a blocking position in that class)— can be a critical tool in maximizing value and return on investment. Investors should be aware, however, that a recent decision by Judge Robert E.
On January 25, 2010, Judge James M. Peck of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that provisions in a CDO indenture subordinating payments due to Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc., as swap provider, constituted unenforceable ipso facto clauses under the facts and circumstances of this case. The Court also held that, because the payment priority provisions were not contained in the four corners of a swap agreement, the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor protections, which generally permit the operation of ipso facto clauses, did not apply.
In a recent ruling from the bench, Judge James M. Peck of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that Metavante Corporation’s suspension of payments under an outstanding swap agreement with Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc.
A Delaware bankruptcy court recently delivered the first decision applying section 562 of the Bankruptcy Code to a claim based on the termination of a repurchase agreement. In re American Home Mortgage Corp., Bankr. Case no. 07-1104, Dkt. no. 8021 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 8, 2009). The court’s ruling creates additional uncertainty in the calculation of bankruptcy claims, not only with respect to repurchase agreements but also with respect to other safe harbored financial contracts.